Follow along at http://www.sckaiser.com/talks/thesis_defense/.
---
Control slides with ←, → and spacebar.
Zoom in and out with shift-click.
F for full-screen.
Information security is an integral part of modern society.
Classical infrastructure is already horribly compromised.
Attacks on classical key exchange will only get worse.
At least many people are Shor...
Potentially Secure Key Exchange
Post-quantum cryptography
Quantum key distribution
Why don't we all have quantum keys?
Distance/Loss: $\approx 300$ km
Hardware developments
Realistic device security models
One approach: QKD receiver satellite
How to make them and how to break them
Distance → Modeling for airborne QKD
Hardware → Robust quantum optical components
Security models → Novel laser damage attack on commercial system
what is physics in each, I DID COOL SHIT
Distance:
Getting to space is costly
Model risk assessment
GOAL: establish a QKD link with parameters representative of a modeled, night satellite pass.
METRICS:
Link time [s] → $\approx 250$
angular velocity [˚/s] → {0.7,1.2}
Raw key rate [kHz] → $\approx 1$
Stratospheric balloons
Timmins
Visual assessment
Altitude threshold
Flight #
Timmins
Visual
Altitude
1
❌
❌
❌
2
❗
➖
➖
3
❗
➖
✔
4
❌
➖
✔
5
❌
➖
✔
6
❌
❌
❌
7
❌
❌
✔
❌
Fail (< 5 min)
❗
High risk (< 30 min)
➖
Moderate risk (< 60 min)
✔
Low risk (> 60 min)
Comms test flights
Infrastructure:
robust devices up to the task
QKD receiver satellite
Single photon detector unit
Integrated optical assembly (IOA)
Acquisition pointing and tracking (APT)
lowest order adaptive optics, beam steering. extensive testing and characterization.
QBER
Security:
Functionality $\neq$ security
How do we use a sledgehammer to pick a lock?
No demonstrated successful countermeasures!
How we made them and how I broke them
Distance → Modeling for airborne QKD
Hardware → Robust quantum optical components
Security models → Novel laser damage attack on commercial system
what is physics in each, I DID COOL SHIT